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Introduction
The number of ceasefire violations (CFV) between India and Pakistan has risen dramatically over the past few years. While the increased number of CFVs are a result of the heightened tensions between the two rivals, none 
of these CFVs has escalated to a full-blown militarized conflict or war between 
the nuclear-armed neighbors. An analysis of CFVs provides an incomplete pic-
ture of Indo-Pakistani relations. The bilateral treaties between India and Pakistan 
are also important indicators of the status of their relationship. This article argues 
that the increased levels of cooperation through treaties and the use of treaty 
nesting in their relationship may be serving a conflict management function by 
preventing CFVs from escalating into militarized conflict. Treaty nesting is a 
technique that states use to tie treaties to previous treaties, thus institutionalizing 
efforts at cooperation between states. Using network analysis, we examine all 
(N=44) bilateral treaties between India and Pakistan and analyze the relation-
ships between those treaties and the impact of treaty nesting on Indo-Pakistani 
bilateral ties. We also analyze and discuss the most important treaties to the re-
lationship. A continued attempt by India and Pakistan to tie future cooperation 
to prior successful treaties may serve to avoid potential disputes from escalating 
into militarized conflict.
Setting
Indo-Pakistani relations have been a hot topic in the media as well as in policy 
circles since the 14 February 2019 terror attack in Pulwama, Kashmir, which led 
to the death of 44 Indian paramilitary soldiers.1 The Pakistan-based terrorist 
group Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility for the attack; India blamed 
 *The authors would like to thank Alicia Rodriguez Castillo and Billy Hines for their help in reading and 
coding all of the treaties between India and Pakistan.
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Pakistan for providing funding, training, arms, and resources to Kashmiri rebels 
responsible for the attacks. India retaliated with airstrikes on a militant training 
camp in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on 29 February.2 Paki-
stan then responded to the Indian airstrikes by conducting its own airstrikes 
against Indian military installments in Kashmir. In addition, Pakistan downed an 
Indian fighter jet and captured the pilot. 
This conflict in early 2019 was important since it was the first time that either 
side aerially crossed into the territory of the other since the 1971 war that resulted 
in the liberation of Bangladesh. While both sides continue to be involved in nu-
merous militarized disputes near the Line of Control (LoC) in the disputed ter-
ritory of Kashmir, the launch of airstrikes constituted major escalation between 
the nuclear-armed neighbors. Despite the escalation, the crisis did not devolve 
into war between the states as has often happened in the past.3 In fact, in a sur-
prising move, Pakistan returned the captured Indian pilot to India, leading to 
rapid de-escalation of tensions between the rivals. This was a completely unex-
pected action on Pakistan’s part, largely returning the situation to the status quo 
between the two states.
The two states have provided contradicting narratives of the events leading to 
the February conflict. India claims that it downed a Pakistani F-16. However, 
Pakistan and the United States deny this. US officials stated that the United 
States’ completed inventory of Pakistani F-16s found none to be missing.4 India 
also claims that it raided the terrorist training camp in Balakot, resulting in the 
deaths of a “very large number” of militants. Pakistan not only denies the presence 
of a terrorist training camp in the Balakot region but also argues that India missed 
its intended targets and only caused damage to forest areas. Further, India has 
been unable to provide substantive proof of the successful raid on the terrorist 
training camp.5
India has endured several terrorist attacks in the Kashmir Valley, many of which 
are attributed to cross-border terrorism supported by the Pakistani military and 
intelligence agencies.6 The United States has also accused Pakistan of supporting 
terrorist groups and failing to thwart cross-border terrorism aimed against India.7 
In 2016, India witnessed another major terrorist attack against a military base in 
Uri, Kashmir, leading to the death of 29 soldiers. India responded by launching 
“surgical strikes” against Pakistani militants in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK), 
claiming to have destroyed safe houses used by guerilla militants. Pakistan denied 
the occurrence of the strikes and argued that there was only increased firing at the 
LoC.8
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Figure 1. Keeping a watchful eye. Indian Army soldiers stationed near Uri, Baramulla 
district, Jammu and Kashmir look toward Pakistan-occupied Kashmir 
The above episode confirms that the danger of an accidental war between 
nuclear-armed rivals in South Asia is ever-present and real. In addition to air-
strikes and a ground battle, India and Pakistan are also fighting a media war, 
where each side is seeking to portray itself as rational, moderate, and a champion 
of mutual peace. To further signal its rationality, Pakistan announced another 
goodwill gesture toward India by offering to release 360 Indian prisoners in April 
2019.9 Most of these prisoners were fishermen caught in the Arabian Sea, which 
lacks a clearly demarcated maritime border between the two countries.
Some scholars of bilateral security ties find Pakistan’s unilateral goodwill ges-
tures to be puzzling. Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan’s announcement that 
the captured Indian pilot would be swiftly returned to India provided the govern-
ments of both states with a face-saving measure and helped to de-escalate the 
rapidly rising tensions on the subcontinent. In this article, we first examine existing 
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arguments for why Pakistan actively pursued de-escalation vis-à-vis India: the 
deterrence effects of nuclear weapons, the rationality argument considering the 
cost-benefit analysis of the conflict, pressure from external actors, and the timing 
of domestic electoral politics. While these arguments are crucial in understand-
ing the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, they do not discuss the impact of institutions on 
the onset as well as recurrence of conflict. As a result, we examine the effect of 
existing institutions on the Indo-Pakistani bilateral relationship and show how 
such institutions help states manage their conflict. This argument explains the 
current de-escalation pursued by India and Pakistan at different points in the 
rivalry, which has prevented the outbreak of war since 1999.
Possible Causes of De-escalation
There are several plausible explanations for why India and Pakistan have not 
gone to war in two decades. In this section we examine nuclear deterrence, the 
high cost of war, external influence/pressure, and domestic electoral politics. 
Nuclear Deterrence
 Both India and Pakistan became nuclear powers in 1998. The two countries 
fought three major wars prior to this; they were also involved in a limited war in 
Kargil, Kashmir, in 1999, after becoming nuclear powers. While the presence of 
nuclear weapons did not prevent the 1999 conflict, both states exercised restraint 
and avoided the nuclear option. The nuclear-armed rivals have not fought a major 
conflict since 1999. The concept of mutually assured destruction prevented a ma-
jor war from breaking out even as the two neighbors continued to be involved in 
cross-border disputes and conflicts, many of which have resulted in civilian and 
military casualties. While the presence of nuclear weapons has deterred potential 
escalation of conflict between the rivals, the nature of nuclear stability on the 
continent is rapidly changing.
Ian Hall argues that nuclear stability in South Asia from 1998 onward was 
largely a result of India’s (military) weakness, but he also pointed out that India is 
unlikely to remain weak for much longer.10 In 2018, India was the world’s largest 
arms importer, and New Delhi has successfully developed the nuclear triad, heavily 
investing to transform India’s armed forces to meet the nation’s domestic and in-
ternational security challenges.11 India is also dramatically altering is nuclear pos-
ture vis-à-vis Pakistan. India has maintained a doctrine of no first-use with respect 
to nuclear weapons, whereas Pakistan has never espoused the same. India has now 
called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and is retaliating against Pakistan’s sponsorship of 
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cross-border terrorism with use of force in an unprecedented fashion. Thus, deter-
rence alone fails to explain the lack of escalation of current crisis.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
All major conflicts between India and Pakistan have led to a decisive Indian 
victory and Pakistani defeat. Pakistan has usually attempted to deal with this 
power asymmetry by sponsoring cross-border terrorism in India as well as sup-
porting the armed separatist struggle in Kashmir. At present, India has a clear 
military advantage over Pakistan, so it would be in Islamabad’s best interest to 
avoid an all-out war. A war would be very costly for Pakistan, which is currently 
facing a severe economic crisis and is ill prepared to engage in conflict with In-
dia.12 While a war would be costly for India, it is in a much better situation than 
Pakistan to withstand the economic costs of war. 
External Influence/Pressure
Bhumitra Chakma argues that the United States, as the global hegemon, has 
played a crucial role in assuring deterrence prevails in South Asia: “More than is 
commonly realized, the United States was integral in the crisis strategies of both 
countries. It played a pivotal role preventing crisis escalation and the outbreak of 
large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan in both confrontations. And the 
American role was instrumental in the termination of those confrontations, par-
ticularly the Kargil conflict. Without America’s effective deterrence diplomacy, 
any of the past South Asian crises could have escalated to the nuclear level.”13
The United States has played a much less significant role in ensuring the de-
escalation of the current conflict. The Trump administration remains engulfed in 
domestic scandals and has vastly scaled back America’s efforts to police the inter-
national system. Also, the United States no longer enjoys the position of dictating 
policy to Pakistan; China has replaced the United States as Pakistan’s largest 
benefactor after America pulled back foreign aid to Pakistan due to Islamabad’s 
failure to clamp down on terrorist networks operating from Pakistan.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global financial watchdog, has re-
buked Pakistan for not doing enough to curb terrorism financing and money 
laundering. The group has threatened to blacklist Pakistan if it fails to make seri-
ous improvement by May 2019, which would have dire consequences for Paki-
stan’s ability to borrow money from international markets, further jeopardizing its 
slowing economy. Being blacklisted by the FATF could also lead to sanctions by 
Western countries, including the United States.14 
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Domestic Electoral Politics
Indian air strikes against Pakistan provide a rally-around-the-flag effect to the 
Modi government in New Delhi, which likely factored into his recent reelection 
in a competitive political environment. As a result, India, which typically dem-
onstrates restraint vis-à-vis Pakistan, retaliated aggressively to the terrorist attack 
in Pulwama. The timing of the crisis just prior to the start of the national Lok 
Sabha (legislative) elections made it difficult for the Modi government to pursue 
de-escalation of the conflict. The civilian-led, democratically elected government 
in Pakistan has often found it impossible to pursue de-escalation and normaliza-
tion of ties with India even if it so desires. This is because the government lacks 
control over the Pakistani military establishment and the Inter-Service Intelli-
gence agency, which is allegedly responsible for sponsoring cross-border terror-
ism in India. As a result, it seems extremely puzzling as to why the Pakistani 
prime minister, Imran Khan, was able to demonstrate diplomatic statesmanship 
and return the captured pilot and Indian fishermen cum prisoners to India, dra-
matically lowering the probability of conflict escalation. In another recent display 
of diplomacy, Islamabad has taken steps toward allowing Indian Sikhs to make 
pilgrimage to a holy shrine located inside Pakistan.15
None of the above mentioned factors help explain this sudden turn in the Paki-
stani disposition toward India. We argue that institutional factors in the bilateral 
relationship between India and Pakistan are responsible for managing the conflict, 
de-escalating, and preventing war. We contend that India and Pakistan are on the 
cusp of “institutionalized cooperation,” and this served a conflict-management 
function within this rivalry. We term their bilateral relationship a cooperative ri-
valry, since while they remain rivals, India and Pakistan have developed sufficient 
cooperation to be able to avoid war. Below, we explain the concept of treaty nesting 
as an institution and its impact on the bilateral relationship between India and 
Pakistan. Next, we provide a network map of all bilateral treaties in the relation-
ship, followed by a discussion of the lodestone treaties. We end with a discussion 
of the consequences for the future of Indo-Pakistani ties and the prospects for 
peace and security on the subcontinent.
Treaty Nesting
Scholars of treaty design contend that international actors design treaties to 
maximize their own preferences, and therefore, those treaties are a reflection of 
their interests.16 While examining the rational design of individual treaties and 
focusing on treaties as institutions is important, the problem with such an ap-
proach is that it assumes that individual treaties are negotiated in a vacuum and 
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are not constrained by prior treaties. In reality, each new treaty is a product of 
previous treaties in some manner and often builds upon prior treaties. Further, 
treaties constrain states’ behaviors. All the treaties that a state has signed con-
strains that state. Therefore, it is logical to examine individual treaties as institu-
tions but also to understand that groups of treaties constitute an institution. A bi-
lateral relationship between states is an institution in the same way that a bilateral 
treaty between states is an institution.
We now examine the ways in which treaties can be grouped to form an institu-
tional relationship between states. Specifically, treaties actively build upon and 
constrain prior treaties, meaning that treaties are nested within prior treaties. 
However, it is difficult to determine which specific treaties are nested in other 
treaties and which treaties are merely stand-alone treaties. As one of our authors 
has argued before, treaties specify their own classification of nestedness. Specifi-
cally, treaties that explicitly refer to prior treaties within their text are nested 
within those referenced treaties.17 
We use network analysis to further understand the relationships between trea-
ties and to determine which treaties are the most central to a specific relationship. 
To do this, we must read and code each individual treaty to determine if and 
where it is nested. Using nestedness to show how treaties are related to one an-
other, it is then possible to use network analysis to visualize the relationship be-
tween the treaties as well as determine the degree of centrality and relative impor-
tance of certain treaties.18 Treaty network analysis allows scholars the opportunity 
to not only identify how the treaties interact to create a regional order, but also to 
identify specific treaties which are the most important treaties, further referred to 
as lodestone treaties. These lodestone treaties are significant because they serve as 
the foundation for all the other treaties within the relationship.
Treaty networks can also help illuminate the strength of a bilateral relationship 
and the likelihood that the relationship between two states would devolve into 
conflict. For example, the stronger the treaty network between two states, the less 
likely it is for them to engage in bilateral conflict against each other.19 Thus, by 
examining the relationship between treaties, we can analyze the strength of the 
bilateral relations between states and their levels of cooperation. To determine the 
degree of nesting within the bilateral relationship, Michael Slobodchikoff divides 
the number of treaty ties in the relationship by the number of treaties. This allows 
a comparison between dyadic relationships. Specifically, he argues that there are 
three categories for determining the quality of a bilateral relationship. If the ties 
divided by treaties is greater than 1, then the relationship is a cooperative rela-
tionship. The reason for this is that each treaty is an attempt at cooperating. Ty-
ing a treaty to another treaty institutionalizes the cooperation. Thus, a higher 
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level of institutionalized cooperation than attempts at cooperation is considered 
to be a cooperative relationship. The second level of cooperation is where the 
number of ties is less than the number of treaties. This means that there have 
been attempts at cooperating over specific issues but no real attempts to institu-
tionalize that cooperation, known as ad hoc cooperation. Finally, the third level of 
cooperation is where the number of ties and the number of treaties are equal. 
This is the breakeven point, where a relationship is neither cooperative nor ad 
hoc cooperation.20
We conduct a systematic analysis of the 44 bilateral treaties between India and 
Pakistan between 1947 and 2017.21 To provide some context, in the same period, 
India signed 168 bilateral treaties with its close ally Russia, 163 treaties with 
China, and 58 with the United States. Thus, the total number of treaties between 
India and Pakistan is not an anomaly in either direction. States may become 
party to multilateral agreements for a multitude of reasons; unlike bilateral agree-
ments, multilateral agreements do not necessarily represent cooperation within a 
dyad. India and Pakistan are a part of several multilateral frameworks, but they 
do not always interact or agree on issues under consideration. As a result, bilat-
eral treaties are a better indicator of a state’s intentionality toward another, and 
we limit our analysis to all bilateral treaties signed between India and Pakistan. 
Multilateral treaties are included in the network map (fig. 2) only when a bilat-
eral agreement explicitly references them: i.e., when a bilateral treaty is nested 
within a multilateral one.22
As mentioned above, Treaty A is considered to be nested under Treaty B if 
it explicitly makes a reference to the earlier treaty. A tie between two treaties 
is considered to be present when one explicitly references the other: i.e., 
when a treaty is nested within the other. A relationship is considered to have 
institutionalized cooperation when the total number of ties in the relation-
ship is equal to or greater than the total number of bilateral treaties between 
the two states. It is considered to have ad hoc cooperation when the total 
number of ties is less than the total number of bilateral treaties between the 
two states. Thus, by dividing the number of treaty ties by the number of trea-
ties, one can determine the level of institutionalized cooperation between the 
dyads. Table 1 provides a comparison of the levels of cooperation based on 
treaties between India and Pakistan. As in any bilateral relationship, the 
Indo-Pakistani relationship starts with a score of 0, which suggests the ab-
sence of any cooperation. However, over the next few decades, the total ties/
total treaties score quickly jumps, finally crossing the threshold of 1 in 2011. 
As explained above, states with a ties/treaty score of <1 are considered to 
demonstrate ad hoc cooperation and states with a ties/treaty score >1 are 
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considered to demonstrate institutionalized cooperation. Interestingly, India 
and Pakistan are currently in a transitory phase between ad hoc and institu-
tionalized cooperation. They barely crossed the threshold of 1 in 2011, sug-
gesting they are on the cusp of being able to become cooperating rivals.23
As suggested by table 1, since the 1980s, India and Pakistan have been attempt-
ing to link new treaties to existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements, thereby 
creating a dense network of ties. States that violate a nested treaty are not only 
violating a single treaty but also all other treaties that are linked to that treaty. By 
nesting treaties, states increase the costs of violating a single treaty, thereby reduc-
ing the probability of treaty violation. By enhancing the probability of coopera-
tion, treaty nestedness is likely to build trust in a bilateral relationship. It is worth 
noting that while India and Pakistan are considered to be enduring rivals that 
regularly participate in militarized disputes against each other, they also continue 
to abide by many of the treaties they have signed.24
As noted in table 1, the Indo-Pakistani cooperation score was 0.4 in 1970 and 
jumped to 0.96 in 1980. The score hovered at the 0.88 level for a few years, before 
climbing again in 2010 and crossing the threshold of 1 in 2011.25 Thus, we see a 
significant shift in the overall levels of treaty making and nesting between India 
and Pakistan in the 1970s. In 1971, India’s support for East Pakistan’s quest for 
independence led to India and Pakistan fighting a war. India’s support for the 
successful Bangladeshi liberation movement soured diplomatic ties between New 
Delhi and Islamabad. After the end of the war, the India and Pakistan created a 
series of treaties to address bilateral relations, including the landmark Simla 
Agreement of 1972 (discussed below). The two countries also signed treaties for 
the resumption of trade, reset visa requirements, and resumed telegraph and postal 
exchanges. Many of these treaties made explicit references to each other as well as 
previous existing treaties. Thus, as India and Pakistan attempted to restore diplo-
matic and functional ties in the aftermath of the second war between them, they 
created a number of nested treaties.26
Table 1. Cooperation Scores in the Indo-Pakistan dyad












While the network of treaties has not reduced or eliminated cross-border vio-
lence between India and Pakistan, it does demonstrate the ability of states to find 
pockets of cooperation that can eventually spill over into other issue areas, thereby 
enhancing cooperation. Table 2 provides information on the total number of 
CFVs between India and Pakistan that have taken place between 2002 and 2018, 
which rose sharply in 2017 and 2018.27 This is attributed to the increased terrorist 
activity in the Kashmir Valley. The government of India informed the Indian par-
liament that 881 CFVs took place in Kashmir in 2017. At the same time, the 
Pakistani army reported 1,299 violations in 2017, which is the highest number of 
CFVs of any year since 2003, when the last ceasefire agreement was signed be-
tween India and Pakistan.28
Table 2. Ceasefire Violations (CFVs) Between 2002 and 201829



















*As of 30 July 2018; ** as of 9 August 2018
Lodestone Treaties
Based on the treaty network map provided below (fig. 2), we find that India and 
Pakistan have been able to find clusters of issue areas in which they can cooperate 
and even institutionalize their cooperation. It is important to note that one issue 
area in which the two states have been able to institutionalize their cooperation is 
communications (see far right cluster on fig. 2). Further, certain treaties serve as 
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key building blocks in the Indo-Pakistani bilateral relationship; these treaties that 
are referenced by multiple future treaties are referred to as lodestone treaties, which 
are the most central treaties in the bilateral relationship. In figure 2, the individual 
treaty node size is set according to degree centrality—or its importance to the 
overall relationship. Thus, the larger the treaty node, the more central a treaty is to 
the bilateral relationship. Further, we can use network measures of degree central-
ity to determine how important each individual treaty is to the bilateral relation-
ship. Table 3 shows each treaty and its relative importance to the relationship. 
Below we discuss some of these lodestone treaties and how they contribute toward 












































Figure 2. Indo-Pakistani treaty network map, 1960–2017. (Treaty node sizes are set to 
degree centrality measures. Thus, the larger the treaty node, the more central a treaty is 
to the bilateral relationship.)
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Table 3. Degree centrality scores for lodestone treaties in Indo-Pakistani relation-
ship. (Only the most central treaties are reported in this table. Other treaties are also cen-
tral to the relationship, but are not the most central to the bilateral relationship.)
Treaty Number Official Name of Treaty Degree Centrality Score
INPK016 Simla Agreement (1972) 6.00
INPK020 Agreement on Telecommunications (1974) 5.00
INPK039
MOU On Drug Demand Reduction and 
Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Nar-
cotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances 
and Precursor Chemicals and Related 
Matters (2011)
5.00
INPK027 Treaty on Telecommunications (1977) 4.00
INPK017 Protocol Between India and Pakistan on Resumption of Trade (1974) 3.00
INPK034
Code of Conduct for the Treatment of 
Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in India 
and Pakistan (1992)
3.00
The Agreement between India and Pakistan on Bilateral Relations (INPK016 
in fig. 2, also commonly known as the Simla Agreement) was signed in 1972 in the 
aftermath of Bangladesh’s independence. The agreement served as a peace treaty, 
ending the Bangladeshi Liberation War, which turned into the Indo-Pakistani 
War of 1971 when India entered the conflict to support Bangladesh (formerly 
known as East Pakistan) in its bid for independence from West Pakistan. It stated 
that India and Pakistan were resolved to settle their differences using peaceful 
means.30 The language of the treaty qualifies it as a nonaggression pact between 
India and Pakistan, as per the criteria used in international security studies litera-
ture.31 The treaty also included agreements regarding troop withdrawals and the 
repatriation of prisoners of war. It is worth noting that there have been cross-border 
aggression from both sides, leading to repeated violations of the peace agreement. 
While both parties have violated this particular treaty, it is the largest node within 
the relationship and is a crucial link in building trust and institutionalizing coop-
eration between India and Pakistan.
The second lodestone treaty is the 1974 Agreement between India and Paki-
stan on Telecommunications (INPK020 in fig. 2). This treaty is nested within the 
Simla Agreement and serves as the basis of many future treaties. The treaty 
specifies the types of telecommunication services that would be restored between 
the two rivals, including the charge rates and other details of operation. This 
treaty serves as evidence of the above argument that a substantial amount of 
Feature
JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS FALL 2019  97
cooperation between these neighboring rivals is geared toward the provision and 
restoration of basic services. This cooperation has the potential to spill over into 
other issue areas such as trade and security, and in fact, based on the cooperation 
score, it can be argued that the two states are on their way toward institutional-
izing their cooperation.
The third lodestone treaty is the Memorandum of Understanding between In-
dia and Pakistan on Drug Demand Reduction and Prevention of Illicit Traffick-
ing in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals and 
Related Matters (INPK039 in fig. 2). The agreement underscores the two nations’ 
attempts to coordinate response to achieve the mutually desired goal of combat-
ing illegal drug trafficking. Two other large nodes within the network map include 
another treaty on telecommunications (INPK027 in fig. 2) and an agreement on 
the Code of Conduct for the Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel between India 
and Pakistan (INPK034 in fig. 2). 
A final lodestone treaty that deserves mention is the 1992 Code of Conduct for 
the Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in India and Pakistan (desig-
nated as INPK34 in fig. 2). This treaty is nested within several other multilateral 
agreements, including The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and The UN Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973. By connecting this agreement to 
several major multilateral frameworks, India and Pakistan raised the stakes of 
treaty violation and made a commitment to “the smooth and unhindered func-
tioning of their diplomatic and consular officials in conformity with recognized 
norms of international law and practice.”32 By signing this treaty in 1992, India 
and Pakistan’s cooperation score increased to 0.992 (as indicated in appendix 1).
Conclusion
India and Pakistan are rivals and will continue to be rivals for the foreseeable 
future. The frequent CFVs could lead to an escalation of conflict between the two 
states. Since currently, India’s conventional capabilities far exceed those of Paki-
stan, if a war breaks out, India would have an intense advantage over Pakistan. An 
even scarier scenario is that with both states possessing nuclear weapons, the 
specter of nuclear war is always a possibility. If Pakistan faced certain defeat in a 
conventional conflict, it could conceivably turn to nuclear weapons to protect it-
self. Even if a civilian government might be reluctant to use nuclear weapons, the 
Pakistani military has a long-established reputation for following its own agenda. 
It would be very difficult to predict the actions of a new military government in 
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Pakistan, which could turn to a combination of irregular warfare and the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons against India. In short, if war were to fully break out be-
tween the two states, it could spiral out of control very quickly.
Both states realize the gravity of the situation and have worked at various times 
to manage their rivalry. New Delhi and Islamabad have tried to find areas more 
opportunities in which to cooperate. In this article, we have argued that the use of 
treaties, and more specifically treaty nesting, is a way in which states can increase 
the cost of violating treaties that are part of the treaty network. The use of treaty 
nesting institutionalizes cooperation, thus making it more difficult to destroy the 
bilateral relationship through a conventional war. This helps to manage conflict 
and deescalate an impending conflict due to the violations of the CFVs. In other 
words, we do not argue that treaty nesting eliminates conflict, merely that it pro-
vides a successful method in managing the rivalry and deescalating conflict when it 
occurs.
We offer a unique approach to study Indo-Pakistani bilateral ties. We argue 
that the Indo-Pakistani bilateral treaty network provides key information on both 
states’ intent to cooperate. The current levels of treaty nesting between India and 
Pakistan suggest that both states are attempting to build trust and enhance bilat-
eral cooperation. Their current levels of treaty nesting may also provide an expla-
nation for why the two sides have chosen to avoid war and actively pursue conflict 
de-escalation in the face of recent volatile events.
The bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan has only recently evolved 
to crossing the threshold of being a cooperative one. Further, it is just barely over 
that threshold. Thus, there is the danger that the relationship could regress into a 
noncooperative one, again raising the possibility of a disastrous war in South Asia. 
Policy makers in both India and Pakistan should look for simple issue areas in 
which cooperation can be fostered. Further, policy makers need to be cognizant of 
the fact that they need to tie future cooperation to successful preexisting treaties. 
This will strengthen the relationship and will help solidify an important conflict 
management tool for both states. JIPA 
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